‘Knowing how to explain’ and the construction of meaning: Wittgensteinian considerations of paradigms and “chemical affinity” as criteria for analysis.

Consideraciones Wittgensteineanas de los paradigmas y la ‘afinidad química’ como criterio de análisis

Abstract

The purpose of this work is to present some Wittgensteinian considerations of paradigms in order to capture the essence of ‘knowing how to explain’: these paradigms are simple models that are indispensable in linguistic activities, illustrating the presence of a concept in typical and similar cases. They are tools that reinforce the security of conceptual usage without the need to undermine its existence through dogmatism driven by rigid definitions.

First, we clarify the sentence ‘knowing to explain’ emphasizing that, although explanation doesn’t always conform to a formal commitment in science, it’s essential for the conceptual clarification of its content. Next, we analyze the term “affinity”, to explore its broad relationship with different chemical language’s classes, highlighting mechanical, kinetic and thermodynamic visions. In this context, paradigms describe how “affinity” takes a critical and fluctuating position regarding to other terms such as “attraction”, “force” and “energy”. The task of discerning and associating these concepts carries responsibility of those who seek to maintain transparency in their use of language, recognizing, as in other areas, science can’t completely eliminate all ambiguities (Wittgenstein, 2017b).